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STUDENT WORKS
WHITNER V. SOUTH CAROLINA:
PROSECUTION FOR CHILD ABUSE
EXTENDS INTO THE WOMB
I. INTRODUCTION
In Whitner v. State' the South Carolina Supreme Court extended the
meaning of the term "child" in the State's child abuse statute to include viable
fetuses. 2 In April of 1992, Cornelia Whither pled guilty to criminal child
neglect in violation of the South Carolina Children's Code.3 The basis for the
charge was her use of crack cocaine while pregnant. Cornelia's baby was born
with cocaine metabolites in its system. She had endangered the life and health
of her child.4 Whitner's appointed counsel did not advise her that she had
been indicted under a statute that had not previously been applied to fetuses.5
Ms. Whitner pled guilty and was sentenced to eight years in prison.6 In May
of 1993, Whitner applied for Post-Conviction Relief on the grounds that the
circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea to a
nonexistent offense.7 She also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based
on her attorney's failure to advise her that she was being prosecuted under a
statute that had not previously been applied to prenatal drug use.'
II. BACKGROUND
In an opinion written by Justice Jean Toal, the court first examined the
lack of subject matter jurisdiction claim and determined that the circuit court
did indeed have subject matter jurisdiction if the term "child" in the Children's
Code included viable fetuses." In South Carolina, viable fetuses are considered
persons who are able to recover under wrongful death statutes.'0 Viable
1. No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
2. Id. at *6.
3. S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
4. Id.
5. Brief of Respondent at 1-2.
6. Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164 at *1 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-490(A) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
10. Whitner, No. 24468, *2 (citing Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C.252, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960);
Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964)) (citing State v. Home, 282 S.C.
1
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fetuses are also considered persons for imposing criminal liability.' As a
result, the court found that "it would be absurd to recognize the viable fetus
as a person for purposes of homicide laws and wrongful death statutes but not
for purposes of statutes proscribing child abuse."1
The court also relied on the policies set forth in the Children's Code that
state "[ilt shall be the policy of this State to concentrate on the prevention of
children's problems as the most important strategy which can be planned and
implemented on behalf of children and their families."13 Because the
consequences of abuse or neglect can have profound effects on the child and
on society as a whole, the couirt found that the policy of prevention supported
a reading that the word "person" includes viable fetuses.' 4 Additionally, the
Children's Code applies "to all children who have need of services"'" and
thus lends further support to including viable fetuses as persons.
Ms. Whitner argued that the introduction of several bills to the legislature
concerning the criminalization of substance abuse by pregnant women proved
that the original statute was not intended to encompass viable fetuses.' 6 This
argument was rejected because rules of construction demand that "the
legislature's subsequent acts 'cast no light on the intent of the legislature which
enacted the statute being construed.'" 
7
Whitner went further in urging that an interpretation of the statute to
include viable fetuses would be contrary to legislative intent. The defense
stressed that such an interpretation could lead to absurd results, such as
prosecution of parents for acts that are legal but might endanger the child's
well-being, including smoking or the consumption of alcohol.' The court
rejected this argument because parents of children who are born could
conceivably be prosecuted for otherwise legal acts (like excessive alcohol
consumption) if such acts are endangering the health or lives of the children.
The court further stated that the potential absurd results need not be addressed
because "[w]e need not decide any cases other than the one before us."' 9
Whitner continued to focus on legislative intent, urging that the language
used in the Children's Code demonstrated a contrary meaning. For example,
the Children's Code refers to placement of children "in care away from their
444, 319 S.E.2d 703 (1984) (applying S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976)).
11. Id.
12. Id. at *3.
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-20(C) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
14. Id.
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-20(B) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
16. Witner, No. 24468, at *3.
17. Id. at *3 (quoting Home Health Servs., Inc. v. DHEC, 298 S.C. 258, 262 n.1, 379
S.E.2d 734, 736 n.1 (Ct. App. 1989)).
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homes" and "remov[al] from their homes."' Because "removal" of a "child"
cannot occur if it is a viable fetus, then the legislature could not have intended
the Children's Code to extend to viable fetuses.2 Additionally, including
viable fetuses under adoption and child custody procedures would not make
sense because one cannot "deter abduction" of a fetus ' or provide a date or
place of birth for birth certificates.'
The court addressed Whitner's argument by distinguishing the recent
South Carolina decision of Doe v. Clark.' Doe interpreted another provision
of the Children's Code and found the term "child" to mean a "child in being
and not a fetus."' Doe was distinguished because it turned on language in
the consent provisions of the Adoption Act. Since consent to an adoption must
be given after birth, consent is not valid when obtained before birth, or when
a fetus is viable. The court refused to extend the holding in Doe, stating "[w]e
did not hold that the term "child" excludes viable fetuses, nor do we think our
holding in Doe can be read so broadly."26 Further distinguishing cases in
other states that have held that prenatal maternal conduct is not a criminal act
under child abuse statutes or drug distribution statutes, the court stated that
those states have either an entirely different body of case law from South
Carolina or otherwise limit the independent rights of viable fetuses.
2 7
Finally, because the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over
Whituer's guilty plea, the court found that Whituer's lawyer was not deficient
for failing to advise her of the statute's possible inapplicability. Whitner was,
therefore, not denied effective assistance of counsel.'
Chief Justice Finney and Justice Moore dissented in separate opinions.
Chief Justice Finney argued that "[a] plain reading of the entire child neglect
statute demonstrates the intent to criminalize only acts directed at children, not
those which may harm fetuses. "29
Justice Moore argued that the majority ignored legislative intent and
embarked "on a course rejected by every other court to address the issue. "0
He felt that the decision to include viable fetuses in the child abuse statute
rendered the statute vague and made problematic the task of determining
unlawful conduct. Justice Moore found that the majority's broad reading could
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-20(D) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
21. Brief of Respondent at 14.
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-784 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
23. Id. § 20-7-1790 (1976 & Supp. 1995).
24. 318 S.C. 274, 457 S.E.2d 336 (1995).
25. Whitner, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *6.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at *7.
29. Id. at *8.
30. Id. at *9.
199"71
3
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lead to prosecuting women for failing to take prenatal vitamins, smoking,
drinking, and many more acts that are not in themselves criminal.31 He also
felt that ignoring the potential sweeping impact of such an important decision
could have on pregnant women was unrealistic
2.3
Justice Moore also argued the inequity of women being immune from
prosecution for the first twenty-four weeks of gestation. The first twenty-four
weeks are the most important time in fetal development, but as long as the
mother quits the behavior in question before viability, she will not be
prosecuted.33 Furthermore, he noted a sentencing inconsistency: a pregnant
woman who has an illegal abortion will receive a two year sentence for killing
her viable fetus, but she can be sentenced for up to ten years for violating the
statute in question.34
III. ANALYSIS
A. Arguments for Criminal Prosecution
While not specifically articulated in the State's argument in Whitner,
policy arguments exist that support criminal prosecution of mothers who
endanger or harm their viable fetuses through drug abuse. First, viable fetuses
have recognized legal rights and those rights should be protected. In South
Carolina, a civil action for wrongful death may be brought when a viable fetus
dies because, under the wrongful death statute, the fetus is construed as a
person.3" Similarly, the death of a viable fetus may also give rise to criminal
charges.31 If a viable fetus is considered a "person" that can be murdered
under the South Carolina homicide statute, 7 then it logically follows that
such a person can also be abused.
Second, women who are harming or endangering their fetuses need a
deterrent. Theoretically, the threat of up to ten years in prison should get an
abuser's attention and effectively deter her from using drugs and endangering





35. Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964).
36. In State v. Home, 282 S.C. 444, 319 S.E.2d 703 (1984), the defendant husband was
convicted of voluntary manslaughter after stabbing his pregnant wife and causing the death of
their viable fetus. The court found that it would be "grossly inconsistent... to construe a viable
fetus as a 'person' for the purposes of imposing civil liability while refusing to give it a similar
classification in the criminal context." Id. at 447, 319 S.E.2d at 704.
37. "'Murder' is the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or
implied." S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
[Vol. 48:657
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Third, the costs imposed upon society are very great, and abusers should
be punished for creating those costs. Because women who use drugs during
pregnancy often do not have private insurance, society ultimately pays some
of the costs of intensive care, continuing rehabilitation, and general health care
that some of these infants will require, even well into childhood.38 Society
also pays the indirect costs of lost employment and reduced productivity that
these infants will have as adults.39
Fourth, a desire exists to "do something." In other words, a we're-
mad-and-we're-not-going-to-take-it-anymore mentality exists. The problem
with "crack babies" is very much in the public eye, and citizens are both sad
and angry. The thought of incarcerating the mother to combat the rising
problem of drug addicted babies provides a more immediate gratification than
does the option of increasing counseling and rehabilitation centers. The public
perceives incarceration as a punishment, whereas treatment programs for
unwilling participants are viewed as futile and costly.
Finally, drug addicted babies are innocent children, many of whom are
beginning life at a disadvantage. After birth, these babies may experience a
type of "withdrawal" from the drugs their mothers abused.' Drug addicted
infants are often jittery or irritable, they cry at the slightest sound or touch,
and often they are difficult to console.4 This behavior can impair mother-
child bonding and further increase the risk of child abuse.42 It cannot be
questioned that the innocent and helpless children deserve to be protected.
The above policy arguments are initially very appealing. Good intentions
go only so far, however, and charging women with criminal child abuse for
abusing their viable fetuses does not remedy the underlying social and medical
problems. Even at the height of their deterrent force, criminal charges in this
38. A great number of the women prosecuted for criminal offenses for giving birth to babies
who test positive for drugs are both poor and minorities. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug
Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L.
REv. 1419, 1420-21 (1991). These women generally do nothave private insurance, and Medicaid
pays only a portion of the hospital bill. Molly McNulty, Note, Pregnancy Police: The Health
Policy and Legal Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women For Harm To Their Fetuses, 16
N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 295-96 (1987). The U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services has estimated that there are more than 100,000 cocaine-exposed infants born
each year. Additionally, there may be up to four million cocaine-exposed infants by the turn of
the century. Some are born with serious health problems such as mental retardation, cerebral
palsy, and visual and hearing impairment. Public Health Education Information Sheet: Cocaine
Use During Pregnancy (March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., White Plains, N.Y.) Dec. 1992.
39. Sam S. Balisy, Note, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need To Provide Legal Protection
For the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1222 (1987).
40. Public Health Information Sheet: Cocaine Use During Pregnancy (March of Dimes Birth
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context treat the symptoms, but they do not provide a cure. Moreover,
including viable fetuses as children to be protected under the child abuse
statutes raises constitutional and practical problems when the statute is actually
enforced.
B. Arguments Against Criminal Prosecution: Constitutional Issues
According to the court, Whitner failed to raise constitutional issues in her
Post-Conviction Relief hearing.43 Thus, constitutional arguments were not
preserved on appeal, and the supreme court did not consider them.'
Nonetheless, the enforcement of a criminal child abuse claim for injuries
caused to viable fetuses implicates, at the very least, the constitutional
problems of equal protection and privacy rights incursions.
1.Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment45 ensures that
similarly situated persons will be treated similarly. Because pregnant women
are being singled out as the abusers, a classification based upon gender exists.
For a gender based classification to withstand judicial review, it must survive
intermediate level scrutiny. That is, there must be important government
objectives at stake, and the regulatory means chosen to serve those objectives
must be substantially related to the objectives themselves.46
Extending the child abuse statute to include viable fetuses essentially holds
women to a higher health care standard than men.47 Because the fetus is
dependent on the mother while in utero, virtually every action taken by a
pregnant woman could potentially affect her fetus.48 While men obviously
cannot have this same kind of effect on a fetus, "paternal smoking, drug use,
battering, and other behavior can adversely affect fetal health." 49 Both men
and pregnant women have the capacity to harm the fetus after viability in
various ways; they are similarly situated yet treated differently.
43. The opinion states that "none of these [constitutional] arguments were even raised to the
PCR court .... Having failed to raise the issue below, Whitner cannot raise it before this
Court." Whitner, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *7. However, constitutional issues were raised
in Whitner's application for Post Conviction Relief: "[Tihe interpretation of § 20-7-50 under
which Ms. Whitner was convicted violates due process and the right to privacy." Brief of
Petitioner at 25. Perhaps this apparent inconsistency will be clarified if a rehearing is granted.
44. Whitner, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164 at *7.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, § 1.
46. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996).
47. McNulty, supra note 38, at 316.
48. Id.
49. Barrie Becker, Judicial Considerations When Sentencing Pregnant Substance Users 10
(Peggy Hora ed. 1996).
[Vol. 48:657
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One way to avoid this disparate treatment of pregnant women would be
to apply the statute with equal measure to fathers as well as mothers.50 This,
however, would raise problems with proving the source of the harm to the
fetus because the mother's adverse behavior generally has a more direct and
measurable effect on the fetus than does the father's. It would seem unlikely
that mother and father could ever receive truly equal portions of justice.
A more fundamental problem with the equal protection analysis is that
men and women arguably are not similarly situated. If the classes are not
similarly situated, then equal protection does not apply. Obvious biological
differences counsel against any conclusion that men and women should be
viewed as similarly situated-men cannot carry or bear children. Additionally,
in Geduldig v. Aiello,5 the Court found that pregnancy is not a gender based
distinction 2 and a state action only needs to satisfy the "mere rationality" test
to pass scrutiny.53 Thus, the prosecution of only women under the statute in
question might well survive an equal protection analysis.
Even if men and women were deemed to be similarly situated, it is not
a foregone conclusion that criminalizing a mother's post-viability abuse would
fail intermediate scrutiny. In attempting to protect viable fetuses, the State's
objective is the protection of human life. This objective is obviously important.
The means of punishing women who give birth to drug addicted babies,
incarceration, is, in this author's view, substantially related to that objective.
Because the mother is in the best position to protect her unborn fetus,
controlling her behavior is the best way to effect protection of the child.5"
Thus, the State's interests would likely pass intermediate scrutiny.5
50. There is no evidence that men are being prosecuted for child abuse inflicted post viability
when the fetus is injured through abuse of the mother or by other means.
51. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
52. The Court found that potential recipients of health care benefits were either pregnant
women or non-pregnant persons. Pregnant women are exclusively female, but non-pregnant
persons include members of both sexes. Id. at 496 n.20.
53. "[U]nless a classification warrants some form of heightened review because itjeopardizes
exercise of a fundamental right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic,
the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification rationally further a legitimate state
interest." Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
54. Julia Elizabeth Jones, State Intervention In Pregnancy, 52 LA. L. REV. 1159, 1168
(1992).
55. Because the State's interest can survive intermediate scrutiny as described above, it is
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2. Fundamental Right to Privacy
An argument that the holding in Whitner violates a woman's right to
privacy has a better chance for success than does an equal protection
challenge. A woman has a fundamental right to have an abortion before
viability without undue interference from the State. 56 Because the right to
have an abortion before viability is a fundamental right, strict scrutiny analysis
must be applied to any intrusion upon that right.
5 7
Extending the definition of "child" to include a viable fetus may place an
undue burden on a woman's fundamental right to decide whether or not to
have an abortion before viability.58 The threat of a prison sentence could
force a drug addicted mother to decide between either carrying her infant to
term and facing up to ten years in prison or having an abortion and avoiding
criminal prosecution.59 In essence, she must choose between drugs and the
life of her unborn child.
Because the addict's craving for drugs is so strong, an addicted woman
may opt to remain pregnant and continue to use drugs. The threat of criminal
prosecution may cause such women to avoid detection rather than seek help.
Accordingly, pregnant drug addicts may forgo prenatal care. Without prenatal
care, neither the fetus nor the mother will be medically supervised, and the
possibility of beneficial intervention will be lost.' °
The second option for the drug addicted mother is to have an abortion
before fetal viability in order to avoid criminal prosecution for child abuse.
There is an odd inconsistency about a law that forces this result.61 On the one
hand, the State professes an interest in fetal health throughout pregnancy. 62
Yet threatening criminal prosecution in this instance could actually encourage
56. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
57. The government must show there is a compelling state interest and the state action must
be narrowly tailored to express only the legitimate state interests at stake. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 155 (1973).
58. A state may not place an undue burden in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. Perhaps Casey does not control when the state applies pressure in favor
of abortion, but for the sake of argument, this author assumes any interference with "choice" is
an obstacle.
59. Arguably there is a third choice for a pregnant addict-treatment. However, the realities
of drug treatment centers and their general scarcity virtually nullifies this option. See infra notes
85-90 and accompanying text.
60. "Recent studies show that early identification of pregnant women at risk, anticipatory
guidance and rapid initiation of treatment can prevent birth defects, developmental disabilities and
provide significant positive effects in the health of the infant." Position Statement on Opposition
to Criminal Prosecution of Women for Use of Drugs While Pregnant and Support for Treatment
ServicesforAlcohol andDrug Dependent Women of Childbearing Age (American Nurses Assoc.,
Washington, D.C.) Apr. 5, 1991, at 2.
61. Id.
62. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (recognizing
the validity of such a state's interest).
[Vol. 48:657
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an abortion. By making a woman choose between drugs and her unborn child,
the State defeats the very interest it claims to serve.
While an independent interest in decreasing drug use in pregnant women
may be compelling, including viable fetuses as children for purposes of child
abuse statutes and incarcerating pregnant mothers does not seem to be the least
restrictive means to deter such drug use. Less restrictive alternatives such as
education and rehabilitation could be employed to decrease substance abuse in
pregnant women. Preventative methods could help addicts before they become
pregnant or rehabilitate them while pregnant. Simply put, incarceration does
not directly address the problem of addiction.' Also, convicting drug
addicted, pregnant women for endangering the life or health of the fetus could
be construed as punishing drug abusers because of their status as addicts. The
United States Supreme Court has held that a state law that punishes someone
based on the status of addiction inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment and
violates the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The Whitner decision raises other potential privacy problems. First, the
decision does not specify what activity is considered child abuse. Does the
decision encompass only illegal drug use or abuse? Or is the decision so broad
as to include any activity by the mother that could have an adverse effect on
her fetus? If the broad reading prevails, a pregnant woman could be prosecut-
ed for smoking cigarettes, consuming alcohol, going on amusement park rides
in spite of warning signs, disobeying doctor's orders for bed rest or abstinence
of sexual intercourse, not taking prenatal vitamins, refusing to eat properly,
and the list goes on.' If all of these acts are included, then the State's reach
into the womb is unprecedented and would infringe upon a woman's
fundamental right to procreate or to abstain from unwanted medical proce-
dures.
A counter-argument that supports the ability of the State to restrict all
potentially harmful activities is that a narrow application of Whitner, including
only illegal drug use, may under-emphasize deterrence of equally harmful
behavior. Supporters of this argument point to the fact that the consumption
63. Ideally, incarceration does indirectly confront addiction in that it prevents inmates from
obtaining illegal drugs. In reality, drugs may be obtained and used by inmates through various
sources. The presence of drugs in jail is, however, a problem of enforcement separate from the
ideal goals of the facility.
64. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
65. James Denison, Note, The Efficacy and Constitutionality of Criminal Punishment For
Maternal Substance Abuse, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1122 (1991).
66. Procreation is indeed a fundamental right: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). The right of a competent adult to refuse medical
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of alcohol and smoking have been proven to have adverse effects on unborn
fetuses and should therefore be included.67 Additionally, the consumption of
alcohol, tobacco, or illegal drugs is not a fundamental right. 68 Thus, it is
argued that because the fundamental right to abortion is not absolute,69 the
State should have the power to restrict lesser rights or privileges when their
exercise presents a serious risk of injury to the fetus.7"
Finally, proponents of Whitner's logic assert that if third parties can be
held responsible for fetal death under tort and criminal laws, then mothers
should also be responsible for fetal harm or death.7 While fetal rights
67. Moderate or even light drinking can harm the fetus. Each year, approximately 5,000
babies are born with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS), which is a combination of mental and
physical birth defects that includes mental retardation, low birth weight, and congenital heart
defects. Public Health Information Sheet: Drinking During Pregnancy (March of Dimes Birth
Defects Found., White Plains, N.Y.) Feb. 1995. Almost 50,000 infants are born each year with
Fetal Alcohol Effects (FAE). FAB is a condition that has some, but not all of the effects of FAS.
Id. Cigarette smoking by expectant mothers can result in spontaneous abortion, low birth weight,
premature birth, and may have adverse effects on subsequent growth and development. LAW AND
MEDICINE/BoARD OF TRUSTEES REPORT, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered
Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women,
264 JAMA 2663, 2666 (1990). In addition, many over-the-counter and prescription medications
can cross through the placenta and effect fetal health. Id.
68. Balisy, supra note 39, at 1220.
69. A state may proscribe or restrict abortions after viability as long as the law contains
exceptions for pregnancies that endanger the health of the mother and the life of the fetus. Casey,
505 U.S. at 846 (1992).
70. Balisy, supra note 39, at 1221. However, "[i]f the statute does not concern alcohol abuse
or other activities detrimental to fetuses, one question that arises is whether the justification really
stems from fetal rights or primarily from societal disapproval of crack addicts who become
pregnant." Denison, supra note 65, at 1123. If this is the case, an equal protection problem may
arise because similarly situated women (pregnant women harming their fetuses by smoking crack
and pregnant women harming their fetuses by engaging in other detrimental activities) are being
treated differently with little justification. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, while crack addicts are not a suspect class protected by strict scrutiny
analysis, state action that is based purely on animosity toward the group may be subject to a
minimal scrutiny "with teeth" review. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (applying rational
relation "with teeth" scrutiny because the desire to harm a politically unpopular group could not
be a legitimate state interest). With minimal level scrutiny, a state action is valid if supported by
a "reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification."
Federal Communications Comm'n v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, (1993).
Great deference is given to the state's actions. But with minimal level scrutiny "with teeth,"
deference to the state's actions is not as great, and a state action that would have passed minimal
level scrutiny could fail under this heightened test. Limiting the application of the child abuse
statute to pregnant crack addicts could be viewed as bias and animosity toward the group, and
the State's justification could be found insufficient. Thus, if Whitner is limited to crack addicted
mothers, it could be found to be unconstitutional under a minimal scrutiny "with teeth" analysis.
Because the scope of activities that are considered to endanger the life or health of a fetus is
unclear under Whitner, clarification is needed.
71. Susan E. Rippey, Criminalizing Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 17 NEW ENG. J.
[Vol. 48:657
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legislation appears desirable, the problem with this analysis is that it
undermines the mother's privacy rights of reproduction and bodily integrity.'
Additionally, pregnant women are distinguishable from third parties. Mothers
differ from third parties because whatever a mother does to her fetus she does
to herself. In damaging the fetus, she invariably damages her own body and
must literally live with the consequences.
By criminalizing the mother's activity during pregnancy, the State
subordinates her liberty interests to those of her fetus, and a maternal/fetal
conflict arises. The Supreme Court has not expressly accorded the rights and
protections provided to a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment to a
fetus;' therefore, the fundamental rights of a mother arguably outweigh the
rights of her fetus. "While it is true that the recognition and expansion of fetal
rights could lead to increased resources available to pregnant women, placing
the focus on fetal rights often results in changes made at the expense of the
pregnant woman herself."' With the exception of a very few circumstances,
the mother should be the appropriate person to make decisions regarding the
welfare of her fetus.75
C. Problems with Application or Enforcement
An initial problem with a full force application of the Whitner decision is
that it may greatly increase the work load of local child protective agencies
without commensurately increasing their funding. By extending the child abuse
statute to include viable fetuses, Whitner enlarges the number of children for
whom the State is responsible. Concerned friends, neighbors, and strangers
can now report suspected fetal abuse by pregnant women. Accordingly, the
number of reports of child abuse are likely to increase.76 Local child
protective agencies are required to investigate each report of child abuse within
twenty-four hours.' At the very least, it is likely that the increased work
load without a concomitant increasing of staff will result in less than adequate
investigations in even the most deserving of cases.
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 69, 82-83 (1991).
72. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding procreation is a fundamental
right); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (finding that a
competent adult has a fundamental right to refuse medical treatment).
73. "IThe unborn have never been recognized as persons in the whole sense." Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
74. Cheryl E. Amana, Maternal-Fetal Conflict: A Call For Humanism and Consciousness In
A Time Of Crisis, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 351, 362 (1992).
75. Id.
76. This assumes a public embrace of Whitner's logic.
77. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-650(C) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1995).
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Whitner has already had an effect on abortions in South Carolina.
Currently, a woman may have an abortion in her third trimester to preserve
her life or health.78 In a recent opinion citing Whitner as authority, 79 the
Attorney General of South Carolina stated that his office would prosecute for
homicide any physician performing partial birth abortions on viable, unborn
fetuses that are not absolutely necessary to protect the life or health of the
mother.' The Attorney General further stated that "[i]n almost no instance
which I can envision would this procedure fall within this exception." 8'
The Attorney General explains that because this procedure is arguably
detrimental to the life and health of the mother,' its use cannot be justified
on the basis of protecting the mother's health and life except in the most
extreme cases.83
The Attorney General's opinion is just one short step from criminalizing
all abortions post-viability, even those deemed medically necessary. After
Whitner, a viable fetus is considered a child and a person protected by the
State's civil and criminal laws. That person's life is being intentionally
extinguished by the mother and her physician. While Supreme Court decisions
and the South Carolina abortion statutes have long allowed medically necessary
abortions in the third trimester, they now seem to be inconsistent with the
child abuse statutes as interpreted under Whitner. How can treatment of a
viable fetus as a "person" who is protected by civil and criminal laws be
reconciled with a statute that allows the fetus to be put to death under certain
circumstances? Thus, Whitner leaves the legality of third trimester abortions
in some question.84
78. Id. § 44-41-20(c).
79. 1997 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. No. _ (forthcoming opinion issued on Jan. 10, 1997).
80. Partial birth abortions have come into recent controversy. The procedure entails
"delivering" the body of the fetus while the skull remains in the birth canal. The physician then
enters the base of the skull and suctions out the brain, enabling the empty skull to collapse,
thereby rendering an easier extraction of the fetus. Id. at 4 (citing Women's Med. Prof. Corp.
v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1066 (S.D. Ohio 1995)).
81. 1997 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. No._, at 17. As discussed above, a state can regulate and
even proscribe abortions after viability except where necessary to protect the life or health of the
mother. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973). Presently, the State is proscribing partial
birth abortions in wholesale fashion. While this action appears initially suspect, it likely would
withstand constitutional scrutiny because other, less controversial methods of performing
abortions would still be available to women in need. While the Attorney General limits his
opinion to the protection of viable fetuses, regulating partial birth abortion before viability would
most probably pass constitutional muster under the Casey "undue burden" standard because there
are other safe methods of abortion available. A woman can still obtain an abortion, just not this
type of abortion. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
82. According to some authorities, the partial birth abortion may pose health risks to the
mother, such as hemorrhage and uterine rupture. 1997 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. No. _, at 16.
83. Id. at 17.
84. Making third trimester abortions absolutely illegal raises constitutional problems. "For
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Furthermore, do all third trimester miscarriages or still births need to be
investigated for the possibility of a murder prosecution? The thought seems
absurd, but it is in keeping with the notion that a viable fetus is a person who
can be abused and murdered.
Beyond the abortion dilemma, there is the question of where do pregnant
women get help should they want it? There are few available drug rehabilita-
tion programs that will accept pregnant women.u Generally, the treatment
facilities fear liability.86 One cannot fault them for recognizing the medical
risk associated with even a healthy pregnant mother. Illustrating the
magnitude of the fear, eighty-seven percent of New York City's drug abuse
programs refused to treat drug addicted pregnant women. 7 Similarly, less
than twenty percent of the drug treatment facilities in the Washington, D.C.
area will accept pregnant women.88 And in 1990, there were only fifteen beds
available for addicted pregnant women in Massachusetts. 9 If a pregnant
woman decided to get help, she would probably have to get on a waiting list.
Ultimately, her baby could be born before she received any assistance.
Furthermore, there are usually no arrangements for housing the children that
the pregnant addict may already have. Thus, a lower-income, drug-addicted
pregnant woman without family, friends, or some childcare support must
choose between losing her existing children to foster care or protecting her
unborn child by receiving treatment.' °
As previously mentioned, the Whitner decision may deter addicted
pregnant women from seeking prenatal care or drug treatment for fear of
criminal prosecution.91 Whitner places doctors and nurses in a policing role
that undermines the trust and confidentiality that is necessary to ensure a
patient's free disclosure and proper medical care.' South Carolina law
the stage [of pregnancy] subsequent to viability, the State ... may ... regulate, and even
proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary ... for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) (emphasis added). Thus, a woman has
a fundamental right to a medically necessary abortion in the third trimester that the State cannot
proscribe.
85. Jones, supra note 54, at 1175.
86. Id.




90. Paige Mcguire Linden, Drug Addiction During Pregnancy: A Call For Increased Social
Responsibility, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 105, 133 (1995).
91. Position Statement on Opposition to Criminal Prosecution of Women for Use of Drugs
While Pregnant and Support for Treatment Services for Alcohol and Drug Dependent Women of
Childbearing Age (American Nurses Assoc., Washington, D.C.) Apr. 5, 1991, at 2.
92. Shawn N. Randolph, Note, Pregnancy and the Criminalization of Perinatal Substance
Abuse: Unethical, Unconstitutional, and Poor Public Policy, 2 S. CAL. RV. L. & WOMEN'S
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requires any physician or nurse that has reason to believe "that a child's...
health or welfare has been or may be adversely affected by abuse or neglect"
to report such suspected abuse.' If forced to report drug use by pregnant
women as child abuse, health care professionals will be placed in a type of
adversarial relationship with their patients. Taking the matter a step further,
would the risk of self-incrimination that arises when a woman admits to drug
use require health care professionals to read a pregnant addict her Miranda
rights before discussing the pregnancy?'
This risk of self-incrimination and prosecution in general seriously impairs
a physician's ability to treat either a mother or her fetus.95 Once it becomes
known that physicians are reporting drug use, addicted women may avoid
getting prenatal care altogether. If a pregnant addict did choose to receive
prenatal care, she might lie about her drug use in an attempt to avoid being
reported. The result, fewer women seeking prenatal care or lying about their
drug use, would at least hinder health care providers' ability to counsel women
about the importance of treatment and abstaining from drug use. Understand-
ably, many health care groups are opposed to the criminalization of drug use
by pregnant women.96 In addition, many health care professionals stress that
the problem is a health care issue rather than a legal issue. 97 "The criminal
justice system cannot solve problems of education, treatment, rehabilitation
and family support. The efforts of state and local government are best spent
on developing community prevention and treatment services." 98
Finally, the threat of criminal prosecution may not be an effective
deterrent to drug use by pregnant women. After all, the use of illegal
substances already carries criminal penalties, and these existing penalties
obviously did not deter pregnant women. For the same reasons that pregnant
STUD. 375, 394 (1992).
93. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1995).
94. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
95. LAw AND MEDICINE, supra note 67, at 2666.
96. A recent South Carolina study of drug use in women identified some of the objectors:
In addition to the AMA, the following groups have adopted policy
statements which oppose criminal prosecution of pregnant women who use
alcohol and other drugs: the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecolo-
gy, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Society of Addiction
Medicine, the American Public Health Association, the National Association
for Perinatal Addiction Research and Education, the National Association of
Public Child Welfare Administrators, the March of Dimes, the National
Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence and the Southern Legislative
Summit on Healthy Infants and Families.
State Council on Maternal, Infant and Child Health, 2 1991 South Carolina Study of Drug Use
Among Women Giving Birth, February, 1992, at 11.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 10.
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women ignore penalties already in force, they are likely to ignore any
additional penalties. 99 Addicted individuals have impaired abilities to make
decisions about the use of the substance."° As such, pregnant addicts do not
mean to harm their fetuses; they ingest drugs to satisfy both a psychological
and physical need.'O Neither a pregnant woman's knowledge that her fetus
is being harmed nor the threat of criminal prosecution can deter her craving
for the illegal substance. She simply needs medical help that the legal system
cannot provide.
IV. CONCLUSION
The State's goal of deterring drug use in pregnant women is commend-
able. A well intentioned, paternalistic interest in promoting fetal health does
not, however, validate constitutional infringements. Moreover, the practical
problems created by Whitner illustrate that its means of addressing the problem
are not adequately tailored to the ends.
The legislature should clarify its intent as to whether viable fetuses should
be considered children that are protected by the child abuse statutes. Clarifica-
tion will provide guidance for courts, law enforcement, and social services in
determining who they may prosecute for child abuse. Short of legislative
correction, the supreme court should clarify, at its earliest opportunity, the
scope of the Whitner holding. Pregnant women deserve some notice as to
whether or not their otherwise legal activities may subject them to charges of
child abuse. Notwithstanding judicial or legislative action, the root of the
problem should be addressed. The only practical solution to drug use by both
men and women is continuing education and strict enforcement of current
criminal and civil sanctions.
Finally, the State should provide more assistance to those already addicted
and pregnant. For these women, the State should focus on prevention and
assistance, not criminal punishment. Rehabilitation and treatment beds
(especially ones that accommodate their unique needs) should be made
available to pregnant women. If pregnant, drug abusers are simply thrown in
jail, the source of the problem-addiction-will remain. Skeptics might argue
that increasing resources for pregnant women is too expensive, but when
compared to the extraordinary cost of providing necessary medical care and
special education for children born addicted to drugs, the added costs cannot
be rejected.
Donna L. Casto
99. LAW AND MEDICINE, supra note 67, at 2668.
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